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This study examines the recurring Congressional report
requirements for Defense weapon systems and how that
information is used in Congressional oversight.
The study reviews the acquisition and budget processes
and addresses the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the
Unit Cost Report (UCR), and the Acquisition Strategy Report
legislated by Congress. The study further examines the use
of the report data by Government agencies and presents
problems and recommended changes identified by those users.
The researcher found that there is no other management
reporting system available which presents information in
the detail and form as the SAR and UCR. However, that
documentation can be improved through correction of incon-
sistencies, streamlining and automation. The Acquisition
Strategy Report is a compliance report to ensure enhanced
competition reduces cost and shows no potential expansion
through legislation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL
There is a concern within the Department of Defense
(DoD) that Congress is increasing its role of oversight of
Defense acquisition to the point of micromanagement . This
concern was expressed by Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger
in his statement at the hearings for the Fiscal Year 1986
Authorization of Appropriations [Ref. 1:p. 33]. More and
more reporting requirements are being imposed by Congress
through legislation, supposedly to obtain sufficient
data upon which to base their decisions on procurement
matters [Ref. l:p. 33].
Since 1970, the number of reports and studies requested
by Congress has gone from 36 to 458 reports, an almost
1200 percent increase [Ref. l:p. 32]. Also, the number of
general provisions enacted by Congress into law relative to
Defense has gone from 64 to 213 provisions, or a 233 percent
increase [Ref. l:p. 32]. All of these provisions are
legally binding and often result in increased costs.
Secretary Weinberger requested that Congress minimize the
burden imposed on the Defense Department by excessive
reporting requirements and legislative provisions. [Ref, 1:
p. 33].
Most of the reports addressed above are generally
one-time feasibility studies or reports for a specific
purpose or program. These reports are submitted through the
hearing process, Congressional inquiries or the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) process. Very few
reports that Congress receives from the Defense Department
relative to the acquisition of major weapon systems are of
a recurring nature.
Congress receives information on weapon systems procure-
ment through the Selected Acquisition Report (required
since 1968) [Ref. 2:p. 1-1] and the Unit Cost Report
(required since 1982) [Ref. 3:p. 1]. With the FY86 Authori-
zation Act, Congress will now see the Acquisition Strategy
Report on all major weapon systems [Ref, 4:p. 345]. This
research will focus on these recurring reports submitted to
Congress by DoD and their use by Congress.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of this research were to examine the
recurring reports that are submitted to Congress relative
to major weapon systems and evaluate the use of the informa-
tion by Congress. This research reveiwed, in particular,
the Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the Unit Cost Report
(UCR) and the Acquisition Strategy Report. The thesis
examines wnether these reports could be modified to reduce
Congressional requests for one-time reports and whether
these reports could be replaced by reports which are more
efficient and effective to Congress and other agencies
which use the information.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research question was: How are major weapon
systems acquisition reports utilized by Congress, and how
might these reporting requirements be accomplished more
efficiently and effectively?
The following subsidiary questions were addressed:
1. What is the effect on the development, execution
and change of major weapon systems acquisition
because of the reporting requirements to Congress?
2. What are the major issues and policy decisions
surrounding the reporting requiremep'v^s?
3. Are the reports in fact submitted, and are they
timely and accurate?
4. Should the reports be enhanced or eliminated?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The thesis defines the various recurring reports that
are submitted to Congress and analyzes what is done with
the information. The thesis evaluates how the preparation
of the reports is impacted by the fact that they are submit-
ted to Congress (e.g., generalization, vagueness, limited
alternatives ) .
Two major weapon systems were reviewed (the F-14 and the
T45TS (VTXTS) aircraft) with a focus on how the Congression-
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al reports have been processed. Updates and changes to the
reports were addressed as a result of program changes and
funding shifts.
The thesis did not consider one-time Congressional
reporting requirements relative to major weapon systems,
either from Congressmen or Committees. The research was
limited to Navy programs and reports, rather than all the
Services.
It is assumed that the reader has a basic understanding
of the Federal acquisition process, program management
functions, DoD terminology, and the legislative and budget
processes.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The information used in this thesis was obtained by
several methods. A search of current and past literature
was performed from the Congressional Record, DoD Directives
and Instructions, reports from the Secretary of Defense,
Congressional Budget Office and General Accounting Office.
Personal interviews were held with program managers, budget
analysts, management analysts, military memoers and Congres-
sional staffers. Literature was also obtained from the
Naval Postgraduate School Library and the Federal Contract
Report Service.
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
This thesis is organized into five chapters. Chapter
II describes the major weapon systems acquisition process,
the budget process and defines the recurring report require-
ments for the Defense Department. Chapter III presents the
users of the report from DoD to Congress. Chapter IV
analyzes the issues and problems associated with submission
of the reports. Chapter V provides conclusions and recom-
mendations based on this research effort.
12
II. FRAMEWORK AND BACKGROUND
A. INTR9DUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a definition
of the major weapon systems acquisition process and show
its relationship to the various pieces of information that
are provided to Congress from the Defense Department.
Included will be a discussion of the acquisition process,
the budget process and the three significant reports
submitted to Congress, primarily the Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR), the Unit Cost Report (UCR) and the Acquisition
Strategy report. Each section will present the policies,
the objectives and the process. The chapter will set the
framework for subsequent chapters which present and analyze
research data,
B. THE MAJOR V/EAPON SYSTEMS ACQUISITION PROCESS
It is necessary to understand the major weapon systems
acquisition process so that the reader is aware of when and
why information is communicated to Congress. Since Congress
authorizes and appropriates funds for defense programs,
they have a direct interest in the acquisition process.
They nave becor.ie more involved in the details and have
added constraints and objectives to individual programs
through authorizations and appropriations. [Ref. l:p. 32]
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Acquisition policy for Executive Branch agencies is
prescribed in Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-109, Major System Acquisitions, The policies are designed
to assure effectiveness and efficiency of the process of
acquiring major systems [Ref. 5:p. 3]. It requires agencies
to communicate with Congress early in the system acquisition
process by relating programs to agency mission needs through
the budget process. Needs and program objectives are to be
expressed in mission terms and not equipment terms.
Alternative system design concepts, as well, are to be
expressed in mission terms and not equipment terms and are
to be explored to generate innovation and competition from
industry.
Beginning with the FY79 budget, agencies were to inform
Congress in the normal budget process regarding agency
missions, capabilities, deficiencies, and needs and objec-
tives related to acquisition programs [Ref. 5:p. 11].
DoD Directive 5000.1, Major System Acquisition, and DoD
Instruction 5000.2, Major System Acquisition Procedures,
provide specific policy and guidance to the Military
Departments for major system acquisitions. Management
responsibility is decentralized and delegated to the lowest
level, except for decisions specifically retained by the
Secretary of Defense [Ref. 6:p. 1]. Designation of a
certain program as a major system may be done by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDR&E)
14
or the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and
Logistics) (ASD(A&L)) at any point in the acquisition
process [Ref. 7:p. 2].
There are four distinct phases and milestones in the
system acquisition process. They are illustrated in
Appendix A and also described below.
1
,
Mission Need Determination (Milestone 0)
DoD Components may identify a major system acquisi-
tion program to the SECDEF because of an identified defici-
ency in an existing capability, a decision to establish a
new capability in response to a technologically feasible
opportunity, an opportunity to reduce DoD cost of ownership
or in response to a change in national defense policy.
This need is identified by the department in the Justifica-
tion of Major System New Start (JMSNS). This document is
submitted with the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) as
part of the Program, Planning and Budgeting System (PPBS)
process. The POM process usually occurs during the month
of May of each year. SECDEF may sanction the JMSNS in the
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) which completes Milestone
and authorizes the Component, when funds become available,
to initiate the next acquisition phase [Ref. 6:p. 4],
2
.
Concept Exploratio n (Prog ram Initiation)
In this phase alternative concepts are solicited
from industry. The designated Program Manager (PM) makes
his recommendation for those concepts which can be further
15
developed and evaluated. This recommendation is documented
in the System Concept Paper (SCP). At this point he also
prepares the acquisition strategy for the program.
The SCP is submitted to the Joint Requirements and
Management Board (formerly the Defense System Acquisition
Review Council) and then forwarded, if approved, to the
SECDEF. The authority to proceed to the next phase is
provided in the Secretary of Defense Decision Memorandum
(SDDM) .
3. Demonstration and Validation (Milestone I)
A Milestone I decision allows the system to enter
the Demonstration and Validation phase. This phase is a
validation of the requirement based on preliminary evalua-
tion of concepts, costs, schedule, readiness objectives and
affordability [Ref. 6:p. 4]. At this point engineering
development is required to bring the concept to fruition.
Mission and performance parameters are defined and perfor-
mance/cost tradeoffs are made [Ref. 9:p. 3-271. The PM
will document the results of this phase in the Decision
Coordinating Paper/Integrated Program Summary (DCP/ISP) and
submit the document through the JRMB to the SECDEF who
approves this phase also using the SDDM [Ref. 8:p. 2-10],
U . Full Scale Enginee r ing Development (Milestone II)
A Milestone II decision allows the system to enter
Full Scale Engineering Development. This phase is divided
into three subphases: engineering, prototype and pilot-
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production/transition to production. It produces a fully
designed, tested and documented prototype [Ref. 9:p.
1-15]. A formal technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) and
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) are performed in order to
certify readiness for the production phase. The PM docu-
ments his recommendations in an updated DCP/IPS through the
JRMB to the SECDEF or as delegated by the Service Secretary,
provided the thresholds established at Milestone II are met.
5. Production and Deployment (Milestone III)
A Milestone III decision allows the system to enter
the Production and Deployment phase. One or more contrac-
tors are awarded a production contract for either low-rate
or full-rate production. The system is introduced to the
Fleet and the system acquisition process is complete.
Navy programs are classified by Acquisition Catego-
ries (ACATs) which determine the level of review. A program
is assigned an ACAT when first authorized based on its
estimated cost, criticality and political sensitivity. A
program may be redesignated any time thereafter. Documenta-
tion supporting the program initiation and milestone
decisions include appropriate ACAT recommendations. ACAT I
requires review and approval by the SECDEF. Normally this
designation is made when the new start is authorized in the
Program Decision Memoranduni (PDM).
The decision to designate any system as major may
be based upon (1) development risk, urgency of need, or
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other items of interest to the SECDEF; (2) joint acquisi-
tions; (3) the estimated funding requirement (thresholds of
$200 million in RDT&E funds or $1 billion in procurement
funds (both in FY80 dollars); and (4) significant congres-
sional interest. ACAT II, III and IV designated programs
are delegated to the Navy for approval and represent lower
dollar thresholds and individual needs or interests. [Ref.
9:p. 1-4]
The major weapon systems acquisition process is
long and complex with many decision points and many players.
At no time in the process is information passed directly to
Congress that identifies total acquisition cost by yaar
through the life of a program. Also, at no time in the
acquisition process are schedule or performance changes
passed on to Congress, which could impact total costs of
the program in out years.
C. THE BUDGET PROCESS
Understanding and adhering to the budget process is
critical to those in the major weapon systems acquisition
process. Successfully passing a milestone decision is no
guarantee of full funding [Ref. 9:p. 3-10]. The PM must
concern himself with the status of the budget and ensure
that submissions are timely for the next milestone in
the acquisition process. Otherwise, the program may be
delayed, lose momentum and potential political favor.
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The acquisition process operates under milestone
decisions; the budget process runs on a tightly structured
schedule. The Federal budget process has four main phases:
(1) executive formulation, (2) Congressional enactment, (3)
budget execution, and (4) audit. The first phase includes
the planning, programming and budgeting stages of the DoD
budget formulation. The first phase will be reviewed since
it plays a major role in developing and defining informa-
tion which is provided to Congress for weapon systems
acquisition. It takes two years to complete the first two
phases, from Planning through signing of the Appropriation
Act. As a result, there are always three different fiscal
budgets active in the process. [Ref. 10:p. A-3]
Beginning with the FY79 Budget, all agencies in the
Executive Branch present their budgets in terms of agency
mission in consonance with the Budget and Accounting Act of
1921, as amended by Section 601 of the Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 197^ [Ref. 5:p .113. In
keeping with that policy and the principles of controlled
decentralization, the mission need determination has been
incorporated into the PPBS process.
PPBS is a management dec ision-maKing tool which had its
birth m the DoD under Secretary of Defense Robert McNaniara
in tne 1960's. It is a system which assists SECDEF in
making allocation of resources among competing prograr.is
ana alternatives to satisfy specific objectives in our
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national defense. PPBS can be summarized as follows:
Based on the anticipated threat, a strategy is developed,
Requirements of the Strategy are then estimated and programs
are developed to package and execute the strategy. Finally,
the costs of approved programs are budgeted in detailed
submissions to Congress [Ref. 9:p. A-9]. Appendix B
illustrates the planning, programming and budgeting cycle.
Planning, the first phase, starts with the assessment
of the threat and results in development of force objectives
to meet national security policies. Planning is initiated
with the Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD) submitted
to the SECDEF, who issues the Defense Guidance (DG), The
JSPD and DG provide advise to the President and the National
Security Council on military strategy required to obtain
security objectives. [Ref. 9:p. A-IO]
The Programming phase translates strategy into program
force structure in terms of personnel, dollars and niaterial
by "costing out" force objectives for five years into the
future. The critical document during programming is the
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which is prepared by
each Service in response to DG policy from SECDEF [Ref. 9:
p. A-11]. There is a direct interface with the acquisition
process, since the JMSNS is submitted with the POM for the
Mission Need Determination (Milestone 0).
The Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is the summary of the
programs approved by SECDEF. The FYDP serves as the
20
controlling internal working mechanism of the DoD PPBS.
The detailed information in the FYDP is used exclusively
within the Executive Branch and is not provided to Congress
since it contains information used for internal planning.
Congress, therefore, does not have visibility into the
decision-making process or the aggregate funding that may be
required to support a given program [Ref. ll:p. 4], SECDEF
decisions resulting from the review of the POM and FYDP are
promulgated in the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM). As
stated in Part B of this chapter, PMs are authorized at this
point to proceed with the acquisition process, based on the
JMSNS submittal, to the Concept Exploration phase.
Budgeting, the final phase of PPBS, expresses the
financial requirements necessary to support approved
programs and translates these into annual funding require-
ments. The budget is submitted to SECDEF, hearings are held
jointly with the Services, Office of Management and Budget
(CMB) and Office of the Secretary of Defense (CSD). These
hearings are used to formulate the Program Budget Decision
(PBD) issued by SECDEF, and the Budget Estimate, the final
budget request submitted to OMB and incorporated into the
President's Budget. [Ref. 9 : P . A-14]
The budget is presented in two ways: (1) in terrr.s of
input, by appropriation, and (2) in terms of output, by
program format. Input involves expense dollars (for annual
operations and maintenance, military pay and some research)
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and investment dollars (for procurement, construction and
research). Appropriations have an obligation period,
either single year or multiple year. Output involves
budgeting by program. Currently, the DoD budget identifies
ten broad areas of both mission (force related) and support.
[Ref. 9:p. A-8]
Because the budget is broken down into many parts,
Congress does not have a clear picture of the aggregate
cost of a program. For example, procurement cost of the
Polaris Missile will be included under Program Cost 1,
Strategic Forces; however the research and development costs
for the Missile will be assigned to Program Code 6, Research
and Development.
D. RECURRING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
1 . Selected Acquisition Report
The SARs are quarterly status reports from the DoD
to the Congress on major acquisition programs. The reports
include each PM's best estimate of key cost, schedule, and
technical information for the program. They provide a
useful basis for comparing current estimates with earlier
planning, development, or production estimates (the baseline
estimates) and explain any variances. In addition, the
SARs are the only documents given to the Congress that
identify acquisition costs by year through the end of the
current program. [Ref. ll:p. 1]
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The annual report submitted for the December
quarter is typically the most informative because it
reflects decisions to change the programs in keeping with
the Administration's annual budget submission [Ref, 11:
p.l]. Current law and the DoD's reporting guidelines also
require the December SAR to be comprehensive and include
more data on the technical and operational characteristics,
schedule milestones, and program acquisition costs than the
other quarterly SARs. The other three submissions occur on
an exception basis; that is, when there has been at least a
five percent change in total program costs or a three-month
change in any schedule milestone. [Ref, ll:p, 1]
The SAR was not designed by DoD to be a decision
document, but was intended to report on the progress in
meeting designated cost, schedule and performance targets of
a program, to focus management attention primarily on
changes to the plan, and to highlight breaches of program
thresholds (e.g., the quarterly exception reports). By
reflecting the plans and goals established by the Department
and providing feedback by comparing actual with planned
accomplishments, the SAR is consistent with the current DoD
philosophy of controlled decentralized management, whereby,
the Military Departments are given the necessary authority
and responsibility to perform effectively and are held
accountaole for the results [Ref. 12:p. 1]. However, tlie
SAR is used by other organizations, like the Congressional
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Budget Office, to gain insight into the DoD decision-
making process and to highlight changes from planned to
actual results for weapon systems [Ref. 13].
In 1967 the DoD instituted a reporting system to
summarize the cost, schedule and technical information on
its major programs. This report, then called the SAR, was
to reflect consistent, reliable data on the status of major
defense acquisition programs. In February 1969, the
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC)
asked the SECDEF to provide him with a periodic status
report on major weapon systems. The Secretary decided in
April 1969 to use the SAR to satisfy the SASC requirement.
In 1975, the FY76 and FY7T Defense Authorization Act
established the SAR as a legal reporting document to the
Congress under Section 139(a) of Title 10, United States
Code. However, the legislation did not prescribe any
required format or content [Ref. 12:p. 1].
Over the 19 years of selected acquisition reporting,
the content of the report has changed numerous times, three
of which involved legislative changes. On each occasion
these changes tried to satisfy both DoD management and
Congressional needs. In almost all cases, these changes
have led to adding information rather than tailoring it to
meet the oversight needs of DoD management and the Congress.
[Ref. 12:p. 1] The SAR, according to Senator Nunn, became
so voluminous and unintelligible that in 1982 the Congress
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created a new reporting system based on unit costs, the Unit
Cost Report. The report provides minimal information for
those programs breaching established unit cost thresholds.
The unit cost reporting system includes internal DoD and
external Congressional exception reporting based on unit
cost increases and contract execution. [Ref. 12:p. 1]
DoD restructured the SAR in 1983 to be more readable
and to serwe as a useful summary status report for those
charged with management and broad oversight of major
weapon programs. Major deletions included description of
the system and mission, and ceiling prices on current costs
which define the Government's liability [Ref. 14:p. 1].
This redesign was discussed by OSD representatives with
members and staffs of both the House and Senate Armed
Services Committees. However, these streamlining efforts
were not discussed with the CBO or the General Accounting
Office (GAO), two primary users of the SAR [Ref. 131.
Legislation was passed which prescribed the reduced format
in accordance with DoD recommendation.
As a result of this effort, the December 1984 SARs
were reduced from an average of more than 20 pages to
approximately nine pages per report, with content focused
on more concise explanations of changes since the last
report. Detailed explanations of previous changes and most
of the historical narrative were eliminated to make the
report more prospective, out original baseline estimates
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were still retained to assess the context of the original
plans. The SAR was revised to permit use of computers
and word processors in report preparation. [Ref. 12:p .2]
The CBO and GAO objected to the deletion of data and
expressed their concern to the members and staffs of the
House and Senate Armed Services Committees [Ref. 13]. As a
result, the FY86 DoD Authorization Act (Public Law 99-145)
required reinstatement as of December 1985 all information
previously contained in the December 1983 SARs and added
more data relative to production rates and operation and
support (O&S) costs [Ref. 14:p. 1]. Also, the conference
report accompanying the DoD Authorization Act of 1986
required the DoD, CBO and GAO to provide comments and
recommendations for improving the SARs [Ref. 12:p.4]. The
Secretary of the Navy chose to submit a separate report to
Congress which recommended that the SARs and UCR be com-
pletely replaced by the Development Acquisition Report/Pro-
duction Acquisition Report (DAR/PAR), a report generated
within Department of the Navy only since 1983 [Ref. 16].
Congress has legislated the format of the report
and requested comments and recommendations from all interes-
ted parties in hopes of bringing the issue to full debate
and resolution [Ref, 13]. All reports have been submitted
ana are currently under review.
DoD Instruction 7000.3 of April 17, 1986 prescribes
the proceaures to prepare the SARs and incorporates the
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provisions of the current legislature in the FY86 Authoriza-
tion Act [Ref, 15:p. 1]. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) (ASN(C)) administers the SAR, and
Heads of the DoD Components ensure that program managers
prepare the SAR in accordance with the instruction.
Baseline technical and operational characteristics,
schedule milestones, and cost estimates are established in
the initial SAR. Depending on the phase of the acquisition
cycle at the time the initial SAR is submitted, these
baseline values are represented by a planning estimate (PE),
a development estimate (DE), or a production estimate
(PdE). The PE reflects information developed up to the
FSED (Milestone II) decision; the DE reflects information
developed up to the Production (Milestone III) decision;
and the PdE reflects information after the production
decision. Baseline changes may be requested by the DoD
Components within 60 days after Milestone II and the first
Milestone III approval, and the information is reflected in
the next SAR reporting period (annual or quarterly). [Ref.
17:p. 5]
The SDDM will normally be the source of the base-
lines. However, the SCP, DCP, PBD or tne FYDP may be used.
V/hen only goals have been established in a SDDM, baseline
values shall be expressed in terms of goals rather than
thresnolds. [Ref. 17:p. 4]
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Major weapon systems may be deleted from the SAR
when 90 percent of expected deliveries or 90 percent of
planned acquisition expenditures have been made. Termina-
tion is not automatic, but must be requested by the DoD
Component and approved by the ASD(C).
The formal submission of the annual SAR in December
of each year by the DoD Components is provided to the
ASD(C) on the working day immediately preceding the 30th
calendar day after the President sends the budget to the
Congress for the following fiscal year. Preliminary copies
are sent by the ASD(C) to the appropriate congressional
committees on the next working day. Following review and
processing by OSD, the annual SAR is sent to the appropriate
Congressional committees 60 days after the President sends
the budget to Congress. Quarterly reports are provided to
ASD(C) by the DoD Components on the working day immediately
preceding the 28th calendar day after the end of each
reporting period. Following review and processing by OSD,
the quarterly SARs are sent to the Congressional committees
45 days after the end of the reporting period. [Ref. 17:
p. 7]
The SAR format contains 19 reporting sections, 18
of which are forwarded to the Congress. Section 19,
Cost-Quantity Information, is for internal DoD use only.
Normally, a SAR will be limited to 20 pages [Ref. 17:p.
3-1]. All cost information throughout the SAR is designateo
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by type of appropriation (RDT&E, procurement, MILCON, and
O&M) . The procurement and program acquisition unit costs
are computed in base-year and then-year dollars for the PE,
DE, or PdE, whichever is applicable. The procurement costs
are displayed in three increments: (1) flyaway, rollaway,
or sailaway costs; (2) other weapon system cost; and (3)
initial spares. [Ref. I7:p. 3-5]
All narrative and cost information is presented in
terms of past estimates, current estimates and reasons for
the change, whether it cost, schedule or performance
parameters that are being discussed. The changes to cost
are written in terms of economic or program changes. These
cost variances must be categorized by one of seven types
(economic, quantity, schedule, engineering, estimating,
support or other). [Ref. 17:p. 3-2]
Section 12 of the SAR details the unit cost repor-
ting requirements. Unit costs are reported by total
program acquisition costs and the current procureraent costs
oy the estimate for the current year and the budget year.
The SAR requires other items of data such as
mission description, program highlights and significant
developments since the last report. The SAR also requires
a listing of the six largest contracts exceeding 32 million,
a program funding sumr.iary, production rate data, and
operating and support data.
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The SAR is a very detailed document which requires
data to be categorized into variances with extensive
explanations for changes. The SARs are submitted for
designated major weapon systems, but they have a direct
correlation with the budget process, since they must match
the President's budget submission for the next fiscal
year. Working from that budget the annual December SARs
extend the cost estimates for each system to the end of
that program as it is planned at the present time. This
extension of costs provides a more complete picture of the
Administration's defense plans for the weapon systems than
does the annual budget. [Ref. I8:p, xi]
2. Unit Cost Report
Significant increases in budget authority and
outlays for Defense investment programs in the President's
budgets have brought increased Congressional concern about
cost overruns in the acquisition of weapon systems [Ref.
I8:p. 1]. The FY82 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law
97-86) contained the Nunn-McCurdy Amendment, which required
the Service Secretaries to submit unit cost exception
reports to the Congress when unit costs addressed in the
FY82 SARs increased by 15 percent over annually established
baselines. This information was extracted from Section 12
of the SAR. The FY83 Defense Authorization Act (Public Law
97-252) extended the requirement indefinitely. The Act
established a three-tiered reporting requirement to identify
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programs that have significant cost growth. The purpose is
to provide a means by which the Congress can become aware
of cost growth early enough to take remedial action [Ref.
I8:p. 19],
The Act requires that the Service Secretaries
notify the Congress of programs in which: (1) the program
acquisition unit cost (PAUC) is more than 15 percent above
the baseline; (2) the current procurement unit cost (CPUC)
is more than 15 percent above the baseline; or (3) cost or
schedule variances of a major contract have resulted in an
increase in the cost of the contract of at least 15 percent
over the initial cost of the contract. The Service Secreta-
ries must notify Congress within 30 days after the date on
which the unit cost report is submitted, either as a part
of the annual or quarterly SAR. [Ref. I8:p. 19]
If unit cost growth exceeds the baseline by 25
percent or more, the SECDEF must certify in writing to
Congress that the system is still required. The SECDEF must
provide certification to Congress of the 25 percent breach
within 60 days of his determination. If the reports are not
provided to Congress, any further obligation of RDT&D,
procurement or MILCON funds for major contracts is suspen-
ded. [Ref. 3:p. 7]
Under the current procedures, unit cost can increase
as much as 15 percent annually without a unit cost exception
report being required. This increase allows for a combina-
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tion of inflation and real cost growth. During periods of
high inflation, a unit cost exception report would be
triggered by a small increase in real cost growth. Con-
versely, when inflation is low, a large increase in real
cost growth would be required before a unit cost exception
report is issued. [Ref. 14:p. 25] The unit cost thres-
hold of 15 percent was established in I98I when inflation
was much higher than it is now. Current inflation rates of
less than four percent allow real cost growth to increase
more than 11 percent before a unit cost exception report is
issued.
For the purpose of measuring unit cost growth in
accordance with the Nunn-McCurdy amendment, the unit cost
is defined to be the cost per full-equipped weapon system.
This cost includes and amortizes RDT&E and MILCON costs
across the program procurement quantity and includes
prototype costs. For most systems, DoD uses the number
and type of units that Congress authorizes each year (e.g.,
aircraft, missiles, ships). For some systems, however, DoD
uses battery equivalents, fire control sections, and self-
propelled-loader-launchers for these calculations [Ref. 11:
p. 8]. This makes the unit of measure different, thereby
making comparisons with prior years and prior programs
ind irec t
.
DoD Instruction 7000.3, Selected Acquisition
Report, prescribes the requirements within the SAR for the
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Unit Cost Report requirements. DoD Instruction 7220.31,
Unit Cost Reports, provides the procedures and assigns
responsibilities for unit cost reporting [Ref. 3:p. 1],
.
i^s with the SAR, Congress legislated the format of
the UCR with the FY86 Defense Authorization Act and reques-
ted comments and recommendations from OSD, CBO and GAO for
improving the report.
3 . Acquisition Strategy Report
Acquisition strategy has become a critical element
in the weapon system acquisition process. 0MB Circular No.
A-109 addresses the tailoring of the acquisition strategy
as a management objective for each program as soon as the
agency decides to solicit alternative system design concepts
that could lead to the acquisition of a new major system,
and to refine the strategy as the program proceeds through
the acquisition process [Ref. 5:p. 51. DoD Directive
5000.1 requires DoD Components to develop an acquisition
strategy at the inception of each major system acquisition
that sets forth the objectives, resources, management
assumptions, extent of competition, proposed contract types,
and program structure and then tailor the steps in the
acquisition decision-making process to this strategy [Ref.
6:p. 2]. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), imple-
mented in April 1984 addressed acquisition planning and tne
requirement for an acquisition plan in Part 7. The flow-
down regulations (the DoD FAR Supplement and tne Navy
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Acquisition Regulation FAR Supplement (NARSUP)) contained
additive language for an acquisition plan.
The acquisition strategy, the acquisition plan and
acquisition planning are used interchangeably in the
literature and in conversation; however, they are separate
concepts and documents. The acquisition strategy is a
conceptual basis for the overall plan that a Program Manager
follows in program execution. It is the framework for
planning and directing the program [Ref. 8:p. 1-1]. The
strategy considers the weapon system from the embryonic
stages of program formulation through the critical phases
of demonstration and full scale development to production
[Ref. 19:p. 2].
The acquisition plan, however, specifically addres-
ses the immediate procurement action. [Ref. 8:p. 4-5] It
integrates information from other functional plans, such as
integrated logistics support (ILS) or test and evaluation
(T&E), and is updated as the process continues for that
contract
.
Acquisition planning is a process by which the
efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition
are coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive plan
for fulfilling the agency need in a timely manner and at a
reasonable cost. It includes developing the overall
strategy for managing the acquisition [Ref. 20:p. 7-1].
3n
During the early 1980'3 there was a major thrust
within the Navy to use the acquisition strategy as a
separate summary document. However, the report ran contrary
to the Paperwork Reduction Act since it was considered the
same as the acquisition plan, and it was not accepted by
the PM's as a useful document. Therefore, the acquisition
strategy reverted to a concept rather than a document.
[Ref. 21]
The FAR decentralized the acquisition plan to the
Federal agencies and allows variances of specific plan
content. The Agency Heads may write the plan on a system
basis or an individual contract basis; they may establish
criteria and thresholds for the plans and establish standard
formats for the plans; they may also review and approve the
plans within various echelon levels.
The FAR requires two sections in the acquisition
plan. The acquisition background and objectives section
contains seven parts, including needs statements, cost
goals performance parameters, risks, and other general
information. The plan of action section contains 19 parts
relating to specific business and technical decisions, such
as competition, sources, funding specifications, testing,
logistics, government property, environmental and security
considerations and milestones.
Since the FAR has been implemented, the Navy uses
the acquisition plan for documentation purposes and not tne
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acquisition strategy [Ref. 21]. The ASN(S&L) and ASN(RE&S)
consider it a vehicle to control the major weapon system
process. The NARSUP was revised in January 1986 to esta-
blish stricter thresholds and to create the approval docu-
ment, the Program Endorsement Memorandum (PEM), by the
Assistant Secretaries. Currently, SECNAV personnel are
redrafting the requirements of the acquisition plan to
simplify, streamline and redefine the acquisition plan.
Business issues, such as how the PM plans to buy the weapon
system, will be emphasized; and the technical issues, such
as XLS and T&E, will be minimally addressed. The Assistant
Secretaries will also use the document to assure compliance
with the Competition in Contracting Act [Ref. 21]
Congress has expressed a concern over the high cost
of weapon systems and the related lack of competition. As
a result, major initiatives such as the Competition in
Contracting Act, have been instituted to reduce costs
through competition. Under the FY86 Defense Authorization
Act, Congress required the SECDEF to prepare an acquisition
strategy for a major program at the point of full-scale
engineering development and submit a report with the
President's budget for the fiscal year for which the
initial request is made for full scale engineering develop-
liient funding.
As part of the acquisition strategy, SECDEF must
provide for competitive alternative sources for the system,
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whether one or several designs, from the beginning of FSED
through the end of production. The SECDEF may waive the
requirement for alternative sources with notice to Congress
if its amplication would result in increased total costs,
unacceptable delays or would be adverse to the national
security. [Ref. 22:p. 264]
To date, no reports have been submitted to Congress
from the Navy. [Ref. 21].
In conjunction with the Congressional requirement,
SECNAV Instruction 4210,6, Acquisition Policy, was issued
on 20 November 1985. It directed that all major weapon
systems nave a minimum of two concurrent but separate
contractors eligible to produce at any time in the process,
from FSED through production [Ref. 21]. Accordingly, this
policy is addressed in all acquisition plans for m.ajor
systems for the Navy and considered a key element in
the PEM approval process by the Assistant Secretaries.
The acquisition plan is an internal decision
document prepared by and maintained by the Military Ser-
vices. It is not used to compile any data bases, nor is it
a management report forwarded to upper level echelons, sucn
as SECDEF. It contains information in great detail and nas
many advocates (e.g., reliability and maintainability,
testing, competition, specifications, etc.). It represents
a contract between the PM and SECNAV on the operation of a
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major weapon system, but is continually updated and in-
creased in scope. [Ref. 21]
Since no report has been submitted by SECDEF to
Congress relative the competitive alternate sources in the
acquisition strategy, there is no prescribed format.
However, SECNAV personnel expect that the report will be
a synthesized one or two-paragraph document relating plans
for competition only and no other information. [Ref. 21]
E. SUMMARY
Chapter II has defined two major processes relevant to
information which is provided to Congress: the major
weapons system acquisition process and the budget process,
specifically the PPBS process. Three reports required by
Congressional legislation, the SAR, the UCR and the acquisi-
tion strategy report, have been described regarding policy
issues, program objectives and existing procedures for
compliance. The SAR and UCR are already being provided to
Congress; the acquisition strategy report has not yet been
submitted.
Chapter III will discuss the users of the report, from
the PMs who often generate the information through the
various echelons within DoD , and through the Congress and
its agencies, the CBO and GAO. The chapter will address
who uses the information, now they use it and how they
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think it may be changed. Chapter IV will address issues




This chapter will review the uses of the SAR, UCR and
Acquisition Strategy Report prepared by DoD. The reports
are prepared for Congress, as dictated by legislation, and
are primarily used by Congress. However, that information
is also used by several other organizations. In order to
gain insight into the preparation of the reports and their
evolution to present any format, this chapter will identify
the users of the reports, when and how they use report
data, and in some cases, how they would change the data
submission, if possible.
This chapter will consider all three recurring reports:
SAR, UCR, and Acquisition Strategy Report. As of the
writing of this thesis, the Acquisition Strategy Report has
not yet been submitted to Congress; therefore, any use by
agencies besides the PM or SECNAV will be prospective.
1 . Program Managers
Program managers generate the SAR, UCR and acquisi-
tion strategy. However, they also use the information
contained in the reports,
a. SAR and UCR
Those people interviewed for this thesis
research indicated that the SAR and UCR are lengthy and
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complex reports, and they are very time-consuming to
prepare. As a result, valuable time is taken away from the
PM's primary responsibility - running a successful program.
The PM perceives the SAR and UCR as management reports
rather than decision-making tools [Ref. 23]. Because the
reports are submitted to Congress, the formats are highly
structured. The PM is responsible for ensuring the accuracy
and structure of the data.
The PM establishes the baseline estimate with
the initial SAR and may request that the baseline be
changed as the system passes through the various acquisi-
tion milestones. Changing from the PE to DE to PdE baseline
requires justification and additional variance analysis to
OSD before the baseline estimates can be changed in the
SAR. Termination of the SAR is not automatic; the PM
must justify its deletion to OSD before he is released from
the reporting requirement.
Any changes to the program must be addressed in
the annual SAR submission. The changes can be in narrative
form, relative to mission or technology changes, or quanti-
tative form, where cost variances must be categorized into
seven areas and balanced with overall program costs.
Quarterly reports are submitted to Congress if total
program costs or schedules exceed designated thresholds.
The SAR is submitted to OSD in March of each
year for the preceding year ending 31 December. Quarterly
ni
reports for breach situations are provided to OSD by the
28th of the month after the end of the previous reporting
period. Since the PM must submit his report through several
approval levels of his own systems command and SECNAV before
it reaches OSD, his time to prepare the report is com-
pressed.
The UCR is extracted from Section 12 of the SAR
and is submitted to OSD by the PM annually. The Program
Manager's Report contains information relative to the UCR
and is submitted to the Military Department Secretary
within seven days after the President sends his budget to
Congress. If there has been a unit cost breach, the Service
Secretary reports it to Congress [Ref. 3: p. 31. Congress
intended the UCR to be an exception reporting requirement
only. However, the PM must submit a report to SECNAV
whether or not a breach has occurred.
People who are assigned to the Program Manage-
ment Office for two Navy programs were interviewed to
determine how they generate the SAR and UCR information and
how they also use that information.
The T45TS Navy Undergraduate Jet Flight Training
System will replace the T-2C and TA-4J trainers to provide
training for prospective Navy and Marine Corps pilots to
meet aircrew requirements in the 1990*s. The T45TS ia a
derivative of the British Aerospace HAWK. The SDDM was
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issued in October 1984, authorizing the T45TS program to
enter FSED. [Ref. 2U:p. 2]
Since the T45TS Program is new, it uses esti-
mates and goals versus concrete, well-defined information
for its program data. Historical cost and performance data
have not been accumulated because it is a new program. As a
result, the PM must make performance assumptions and use
cost estimates. The most difficult problem is deriving
reasons for cost variances. The variances must be categor-
ized into the seven areas identified in the SECDEF instruc-
tion. Without historical cost information, it is very
difficult for example to attribute separate dollar figures
to schedule slippage and technical changes.
The interviewees felt that the PM has a tendency
to put most of the cost variances into the easily explain-
able categories, such as revised escalation indices or
changed quantities [Ref. 231. Justification is minimal for
any remaining cost variances which cannot be clearly
categorized. Statements such as "revision to the methodol-
ogy for estimating engineering hours" or "more refined
estimate of ILS requirements" were given in the SAR for the
T45TS [Ref. 24:p. 8]. Preparing the SAR can become creative
accounting because cost adjustments may not fit neatly into
seven economic or operational categories [Ref. 231.
The F-14A/D is a well-established aircraft
program. the F-14A has been in production for several
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years and the F-14D is currently in FSED. The F-14 has a
program base year of 1969 and has accumulated much histori-
cal cost and performance data. The technology is well-
defined and therefore, the F-14 has less uncertainty than
the T45TS program. However, the PM still has the same
problems of defining and categorizing the cost variances
[Ref. 25].
For example, the PM must incorporate engineering
change proposals into the seven categories. Again, the
larger variances are listed in the obvious categories, and
any remaining variances applied to estimating categories
with minimal explanation for the increase or decrease.
The interviewee indicated that the PM of an
established program has to coordinate with other functional
areas in preparing the reports. He has to consider military
construction for operational facilities; become more
involved with the Contracting Officer for contract admini-
stration; and interact with the operations research people
for statistical analysis and models, such as learning
curves. Therefore, the SAR and UCR are not perceived solely
as a PM document. [Ref. 25]
According to the interviewees, the SAR or UCR
are not used as a decision document or a management tool
[Ref. 23]. The various acquisition milestone and budget
documents are used as decision documents. Contractor
progress reports, program design reviews and Cost/Schedule
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Control System Criteria Reports provide management tools for
the PM during program operation. However, the SAR and UCR
are used as benchmarks for cost and performance analysis.
They provide a red flag for the PM where actual events vary
from planned actions.
The SAR and UCR are also used as a ready
reference by the PM for inquiries from OSD or Congressional
staffers. The PM can quickly identify the current unit
cost or total cost of the program. The two interviewees
felt that the SAR was not used by Congressional staffs.
Rather than read the SAR, the staffers would obtain informa-
tion from PMs over the phone.
There are three common areas where change could
make the SAR and UCR easier to generate and more useful,
according to the interviewees. [Ref. 23, 25]
First, the reports are lengthy and complex, and
there is a major learning process required by those respon-
sible for their preparation. The PM and BFM positions
experience a high turnover, and the support staff is not at
the level of expertise to prepare the report independently.
Sor:ie PMs use contractor support to assist with the function.
In-house expertise is then lost, and there is still a
problem of contractor personnel turnover. Both in terv iev;ees
recommended streamlining the report process to minimize
learning loss from personnel turnover.
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Second, because the report is submitted to
Congress, format and appearance is critical. The DoD
instruction is very specific as to format. As a result,
there is a major emphasis on the administrative and clerical
portion of preparing the report. Currently, reports are
prepared manually. Both interviewees recommended automation
to solve the preparation problem. The format could be
programmed. Standardized mathematical models could be used
by the operations research personnel to minimize updating
cost variances due to inflation or other standard cost
adjustments
.
Third, both interviewees felt that the baseline
estimates become old and irrelevant. The T45TS, which uses
a PE baseline, has gone into FSED and qualifies for a DE
baseline; however, the PM requested approval to update the
baseline in November 1984 and was denied in January 1985.
The F-14 nas been in production for many years, but since
the "D" version is being used by the PM, they use a DE
baseline. Both interviewees felt the baseline should be
updated more often. Historical data, such as previous
change explanations, are never deleted from the report; they
remain in the report and are continually explained with each
report submission.
b. The Acquisition Strategy Report
The acquisition strategy or acquisition plan
is prepared by the PM at Concept Exploration (Progran
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Initiation). The PM must address how he intends to operate
during the acquisition process. The plan addresses risks,
such as concurrency in testing, and production choices,
such as maintenance philosophies. Problems inherent with
planning any weapon system include unsettled technological
issues, unknown sources of supply and fluctuating budgets.
The PM must make a best-guess of his needs for the future.
The plan is submitted by the PM through the
Commander of the Navy Systems Command to the ASN(S&L) prior
to any solicitation or contracting actions. The PM must
coordinate information from many functional disciplines,
such as logistics, comptroller, test and evaluation, and
research and development. The PM will then produce a
document which addresses technical as well as management
and business issues.
The acquisition plan is used internally by the
Military services. However, with the new legislation.
Congress will see a portion of the plan regarding the use of
multiple sources in FSED as well as Production and Deploy-
ment. [Ref. 22:p. 264]
The PM uses the acquisition strategy as a
planning vehicle, which is changed and updated as the weapon
system proceeds through the acquisition process. The
Federal Acquisition Regulation has expanded the content of
the acquisition plan, and the Services have established
stricter thresholds for submitting the plan [Ref. 21]. The
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program office interviewees felt that the acquisition plan
could expand, especially if it were provided as written to
the non-management agencies within Congress, such as the
Congressional Budget Office or the General Accounting
Office. [Ref. 23, 25]
The interviewees recommended that the acquisi-
tion plan remain as is, without additional quantitative
analysis or planning estimates. In order to respond to the
new legislation, PMs should provide only a general statement
to SECDEF for Congressional review which presents the intent
to compete with alternative sources in FSED.
2. Secretary of Defense/Secretary of the Navv
The SAR, UCR and acquisition plan are forwarded
from the PM to the Secretary of the Navy. The SAR and UCR
are forwarded through OSD to Congress. Currently, the
acquisition plan goes no further than OSD. However, under
the FY86 Authorization Act the Acquisition Strategy Report,
based on acquisition plans, will be submitted to Congress by
the Secretary of Defense. Therefore, reports relative to
acquisition strategy and multiple sourcing in FSED will be
provided by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of
Defense
.
a. SAR and UCR
The Secretary of the Navy coordinates the
submission of the SAR and UCR to OSD. The Secretary
of Defense is responsible for administering the SAR and UCR
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and submitting them to Congress. The SAR is submitted by
the Military Services to OSD within 30 days after submission
of the President's Budget to Congress. OSD has 30 days to
review,, verify, and coordinate the annual SAR submission to
Congress. Quarterly reports are submitted to OSD within 28
days after the end of the quarter, and OSD has 1? days to
review and correct the report before submission to Congress.
[Ref. 17:p. 7]
Senior DoD management are a relatively small
user group requiring summary status information rather than
detailed data for analysis [Ref. 12:p. 4]. According to
an interviewee with the office of the ASD(C), the SAR and
UCR are both used as a source of information for Congres-
sional inquiries, DSARC reviews, and POM reviews. The SAR
does provide discipline for the total program and explains
variances from original estimates. It can also provide
consistency for DoD when explaining to Congress or the Press
about major programs under scrutiny. [Ref. 16]
According to the interviewee, the SAR is never
late. The bulk of the over 100 program reports are submit-
ted to Congress. On occasion one or two programs are
submitted after the total report. [Ref. 16]
The interviewee did say that submission of the
UCR is extremely tight. Therefore, OSD has requested in
their report to Congress, that submission of the UCR be
based on working days versus calendar days, which would
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provide relief, especially when the due date falls on a
weekend. [Ref. 12:p. 8]
The interviewee felt that the SAR provides
information too late to have any impact on the acquisition
process. Therefore, it cannot be used in a prospective
manner. However, it does provide progress information for
the program more often than the milestone reviews.
Congress objects to re-baselining, since they
want a benchmark for comparison of progress, good or bad.
Before 1984, the PM was not allowed to change the baseline.
With the DoD instruction issued in 1984 they can update the
baseline to align the SAR with the acquisition milestone
process. [Ref. 16]
Before discussing the various changes OSD would
recommend, it is worthwhile to address the Secretary of the
Navy's position on the SAR and UCR. As stated in Chapter
2., the SECNAV chose to submit a separate report to Congress
in response to the FY86 Authorization Act, SECNAV acknow-
ledged that there are several agencies that can use the SAR
and UCR inf orraat ion
,
primarily senior DoD managers, Con-
gress, the CBO and GAO. All are concerned with various
aspects of management: oversight, decision-making and
resource allocation. [Ref. 26:p. 1]
SECNAV pointed out that the SAR and UCR are too
lengthy, force creative accounting due to the categorization
of variances and extend reporting into the "almost always
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fictitious out-years". Therefore, according to SECNAV, the
SAR is of no use in managing Navy programs [Ref. 26:p. 4].
The UCR measures unit costs based on total
program costs including development and production.
Because it does not separate research and prototype from
recurring production costs, the UCR is of no use in managing
the Navy's acquisition program [Ref. 26:p. 5].
SECNAV recommended the Development Acquisition
Report/Production Acquisition Report (DAR/PAR) as a substi-
tute for the SAR and UCR. It separates development costs in
the DAR from production costs in the PAR. It also focuses
on the FYDP period rather than the out-years. It uses
constant dollars to eliminate inflation distortion and
provides a quick-look status report for senior management.
[Ref. 26:p. 5] The DAR/PAR is an internal report deve-
loped exclusively by the Navy for monitoring major weapon
systems
.
The general opinion of the interviewee was that
Congress would not accept the DAR/PAR because it was
limited to the FYDP and provided minimal trend data and
baseline information.
The interviewee addressed several problems with
the SAR and UCR at the OSD level and recommended some
changes based on the report submitted by OSD to Congress.
The SAR can be likened to a "Snapshot" of a
program taken at the end of each reporting period. However,
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that snapshot seems to be taken with a wide-angle lens.
The SAR has become an additive report. There have been
increased data requirements, stricter thresholds, and
repetitive information.
OSD recommended that the UCR be eliminated since it
duplicates information already in the SAR. The exception
report for unit cost growth could be added to the criteria
required for the quarterly SAR report, which is over a five
percent change in program costs or a three-month change in
a schedule milestone. OSD also recommended that these
thresholds be increased to a ten percent increase in program
costs and a six-month change in schedule milestones.
To combat the irrelevant baseline problem and
repetition in the report, OSD recommended that the SAR
program reporting be deferred until after Milestone II.
The rationale is that prior to Milestone II, programs are
not sufficiently well defined for meaningful reporting
purposes. Estimates are often little more than planning
wedges, with undefined program quantities and alternatives
[Ref. 12:p. 5].
The second problem OSD addressed was that one
report tries to meet the needs of too many users. DoD
managers and Congressional staffs have a wide spectrum of
responsibilities ranging from detailed analysis to broad
oversight. The desires of staffs to have all possible data
cannot oe reconciled with the needs of OSD management to
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have an information system that provides concise summary
information on the cost, schedule and technical status of a
weapon system [Ref. 12:p. 2]. When OSD made their reduc-
tions to the SAR in 1984, they were trying to respond
to the needs of DoD management. However, the reduced report
did not meet the needs of the non-management Congressional
users, the CBO or GAO. OSD stated in their report to
Congress that designing one output to meet the needs of
several users with diverse interests, motivation and
responsibilities is not practical [Ref. 12:p. 3].
OSD did recognize, however, that the needs of
Congress predominate. Therefore, they recommend in their
report that the format prior to 1983 be used, with the
additional production rate and operation and support data.
These ideas seem to be "popular" with Congress because of
the attention to life cycle costs and economic ordering
quantities. [Ref. 16]
A third problem OSD addressed was coordination
of the SAR. Since the SAR is prepared by approximately 100
different program offices rather that through a central
office, ensuring uniformity and accuracy is extremely
difficult. In the course of the review process, OSD will
discover errors in tabular data and mathematical computa-
tions. PMs are not necessarily consistent in their inter-
pretation and application of cost variance categories.
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Therefore, OSD has a difficult job coordinating the SARs
into one uniform submission.
Graphs have been recommended in years past by
GAO as -a, means of presenting data, but OSD felt that
correcting the graphs could not be done within the statutory
period for submitting the SAR. [Ref. 16]
The interviewee recommended a better overall
training program for PMs and automation to allow uniformity
and standardization. The interviewee stated that the Senate
Armed Services Committee had offered to dedicate funds for
automation of the SAR, but OSD had not yet taken advantage
of the offer [Ref. 16]
.
b. The Acquisition Strategy Report
The researcher interviewed a member of the
Clearance Division, ASN(S&L), relative to the acquisition
plan and the new reporting requirement. Several Changes
have occurred within SECNAV recently concerning acquisition
plans and may effect their submission to Congress.
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)
required several changes in the method of contracting and
placed emphasis on full and open competition at all phases
of the acquisition process [Ref. 21]. SECNAV selected the
acquisition plan as the principal document for program
review and oversight regarding compliance with CICA. This
avoids a requirement for new documentation and also confirms
5n
implementation of the SECNAV policy for dual sourcing in
FSED [Ref. 2? : P . U.
The Navy uses the acquisition plan as a control
document for the weapon systems acquisition process [Ref,
21]. In order to ensure compliance with the new thrust for
competition, the acquisition plan is being used as a review
and oversight document. It establishes a baseline and
acts as a contract
.
between the PM and management. However,
it is a very fluid planning document and is changed and
updated as the process continues.
The interviewee addressed several problems with
the acquisition plan. The plan has become additive because
of advocates, such as reliability and maintainability or
streamlining. ASN(S&L) is currently reviewing the plan
content for consolidation or reduction of reported informa-
tion. One recommendation has been to eliminate information
as it becomes irrelevant. For example, testing results can
be eliminated as a program goes into production. It is no
longer necessary to address design or operational testing
once a system has been approved for service use.
The acquisition plan is not currently used as a
data base; however, it could be very easily. The inter-
viewee said that since SECNAV has identified the plan as a
oversight document for CICA, data are being compiled
relative to receipt, processing and approval of plans from
the various Navy headquarter commands. Average approval
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leadtimes are being computed. Once various advocates learn
of a data base being developed, they may require input to
the statistical data. This has the potential to expand into
an additional management report requirement at the Navy, OSD
or Congressional levels [Ref. 21].
Currently, the plan contains detailed informa-
tion internal to DoD. If the plan as written is submitted
to Congress, the interviewee felt that future plans may jc
written with minimal information and contain conditions and
caveats. In its current form, the acquisition plan is too
specific for Congressional oversight use. [Ref. 21]
3. Congress
The Constitution enumerates powers granted to the
Congress. Those relating to national defense include the
power to declare war, to raise and support the armed
forces, to make rules for the government and regulation of
the armed forces, to provide for calling for the militia to
organize, arm and discipline the militia, and to appropriate
money [Ref, 28:p. 5691. Both the Senate and House of
Representatives have created standing committees for
managing national defense. The Senate Committee on Armed
Services and the House Committee on Armed Services have
developed a formal subcommittee structure and comprehensive
responsibilities for defense au trior izat ion . [Ref. 28:p.
570]
The SAR, UCR and prospective Acquisition Strategy
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Report are submitted to Congress by way of the Senate Armed
Services Committee (SASC) and the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC), Staffs working for the various subcommit-
tees or specific members of either Houses review and
synthesize the data for the Congressmen [Ref. 29]. As a
result, staffers have an inherent potential to influence
Congressional decisions on weapon systems acquisition. The
amount of influence can be measured to a great extent by the
amount of information that the staffer can obtain. Congres-
sional inquiry is a popular channel for information flow,
either through verbal contact with liaison offices or a
written position paper or fact sheet. [Ref. 30:p. 38]
a. SAR and UCR
The SAR and UCR provide continuous information
for staffers on weapon systems acquisition. However, even
the staffers admit that the reports are too voluminous to
use in the Congressional oversight role [Ref. 29]. The
researcher interviewed a staff assistant for Senator Samuel
Nunn, a member of the SASC. He felt that the SAR and UCR
are used primarily as a research tool by the non-management
portion of the Congress (CBO and GAO) and as a political
tool by the members of Congress.
The SAR and UCR are ir.iportant as management
control devices for the Military Services, according to trie
interviewee. Senior DoD managers are forced to monitor
their programs, especially in the areas of cost growth and
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performance and schedule changes. However, the SAR and UCR
are not generally used as a source of direct information by
the staffs within Congress, Congress needs highly refined
data with highly aggregated analysis in order to make
decisions relative to national defense [Ref. 29]. As they
are written, the SAR and UCR are too detailed for oversight
data
.
Fundamentally, Congress has too much to do and
insufficient time to do it [Ref. 28:p. 59^]. There has
been a tendency in Congress to control policy through
control of details [Ref. 28:p. 593]. The previous and
current era of policy decisions and issues was one of "more
data". Now, Congress is saturated. The interviewee felt
that a new era was approaching, one of "data on an exception
basis". The PM receives guidance through baselining and
only reports to senior DoD managers or Congress when he
varies from the baseline to any "significant" degree.
[Ref. 29] The approach coincides with the recommendations
in the Packard Commission for program stability through
baselining. [Ref. 31:p. 59]
The SAR is perceived as too massive to be used
directly by Congressional members and staffs. The inter-
viewee confirmed what PMs have said relative to reading trie
SAR or UCR. If a staffer has a question on a weapon system,
he will tend to call the PM or the Military Service liaison
office, rather tnat read the reports held by his office.
58
The SAR is used, however, as a research tool by
the CBO and GAO. These non-management arms of Congress
synthesize the data and respond to many "what if" requests
by Congress. The SAR and UCR are used for quantitative and
cost benefit analysis and then generalizations of the
findings are reported to Congress. Both the SAR and UCR
are used as a political hammer by Congress for choices
during the budget process for competing programs [Ref. 29],
Congress is concerned about too many new
starts, program stretch outs and inefficient production
rates. They also have a concern for total system cost
growth. The UCR as an exception report provides Congress
with an indication of cost growth and is directly tied to
the weapon system unit cost.
If DoD chooses to stretch out a program over a
longer period of time, it will buy in less than economic
ordering quantities. Therefore, the production rate is
lower and unit costs usually rise. This is due to learning
curve adjustment, inefficient use of capital equipment,
idle time, and lost quantity discounts. As a result, the
total system cost goes up. Congress is alerted to this
cost growth through the UCR. [Ref. 291
DoD has a tendency, according to Congress, to
have too many programs started at once and not being able
to afford them all to the point of efficient production
rates. In February, 1986, the SASC asked the CBO to
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examine what would occur if all new starts were held to
their current funding level and the savings applied to
existing weapon systems to bring them to full production
rates? The CBO reported that over $49 million would be
saved and over 19 systems that were currently in production
could be fully funded to efficient production rates. [Ref.
32:p. 2] The CBO used the SAR and UCR to perform their
data analysis for Congress.
Congress uses information from the SAR and UCR,
but usually only after a highly aggregated analysis by
their quantitative organizations, the CBO or GAO. Congress
uses summary information, but their supporting organizations
need very detailed data to provide the alternative data
analysis requested by Congress. [Ref. 29]
This interviewee recommended changes in the
timing and procedure for submission of reports to Congress.
Because Congress is inundated with data, they do not need
information any sooner than absolutely necessary. He
suggested that DoD be free to deal with national security
and the threat through Milestone without reporting to
Congress. The information is too ill-defined and subject
to change. This recommendation would serve to eliminate
unnecessary data and provide more accurate data with which
to work.
Tne interviewee also recommended automation to
standardize the report process from the Services. He had
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offered to recommend to Senator Nunn that an appropriation
of $1,000,000 be authorized to OSD to procure hardware and
software to automate the SAR submission. OSD has not yet
accepted^ the offer.
b. The Acquisition Strategy Report
The Acquisition Strategy Report is perceived as
another way for Congress to direct more efficient buying
practices by DoD. The interviewee felt that the acquisition
plan was too sophisticated for members of Congress to use;
therefore, only a generalized report was required from
SECDEF addressing alternative sources in FSED. He did not
see this as a growing or potential additive report require-
ment by Congress or its support organizations.
Congress will use the Acquisition Strategy
Report as an assurance that DoD is complying with CICA and
becoming more efficient in the acquisition process. The
interviewee saw no changes that would be necessary with the
report as required in the current legislation. Therefore,
he recommended no modifications to the requirement for the
Acquisition Strategy Report.
4 . Congressional Budget Offic e
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is an analyti-
cal, non-management arm of Congress. They perform quantita-
tive analysis and synthesize data into generalizations for
Congress to use in their oversight role.
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The CBO deals only with the cost portion of the SAR
and UCR. They do not analyze performance or schedule data.
Also, as part of their primary responsibility, they only
provide alternatives or options to Congress, rather than
making recommendations.
The CBO reviews the SARs and presents a report to
the Armed Services Committees. CBO uses the information in
order to perform other basic analyses: (1) computing the
costs of alternative program sizes and schedules, and (2)
estimating five-year aggregate funding needs. [Ref. ll:p 3]
In the first instance, the CBO is frequently asked
by the oversight committees to price alternative levels and
rates of procurement. An example was cited earlier in this
chapter regarding the decision to fund new starts or apply
savings to full rate production. These estimates may be
used by the committees to mark up the budget; that is, to
test the reasonableness of the Administration estimates for
requested quantities or to substitute funding for the
committee's preferred procurement levels. Only the SAR
provides enough detail to allow CBO to compute readily the
learning curve assumptions inherent in Administration
estimates and then to calculate the cost of alternative
procurement quantities and schedules. [Ref. ll:p. 31
In the second instance, CBO analyzes the Defense
Budget using the SAR and UCR. The detailed information in
the FYDP is used exclusively by the Executive Branch and is
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not provided to Congress. CBO is able to model the FYDP by
using various budget justification materials, including the
SARs. CBO's analysis indicates how much aggregate funding
may be required to support a given program and offers
detail to support aggregate budget projections. The SARs
provide the data for the analysis and model. [Ref. ll:p. 4]
The researcher interviewed a member of the CBO who
works directly with the SAR and UCR when performing data
analysis for Congress. He commented that the SAR is not a
perfect document because it is written for too many users.
The reports must satisfy Congress and its oversight role,
and it must satisfy the analysts and their quantitative
role. Without the detail, CBO cannot perform their function
for Congress. [Ref. 13]
However, the interviewee felt that the SAR and UCR
were the best documents available. They provide total
program and cost variance information.
The largest problem with the SAR and UCR is that
they do not match with other cost information that is
provided by DoD. For example, the SAR will differ from
Congressional Data Sheets, which are part of the budget
justification and support tne President's Budget to Con-
gress. This can be caused by changes in assumptions,
sucn as inflation, or coniputa tion errors in the program
office.
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He concurred that the cost variance categories are
not always clear. They do not highlight cost overruns and
they do not indicate trends in cost growth in any given
area. The PMs can disguise many problems within the seven
cost variance categories.
The interviewee discussed the background for the
FY86 legislation. OSD made reductions in the SAR submission
in 1983 without discussing the changes with CBO and GAO.
OSD said they were making the changes to save time.
However, the perception was that DoD was attempting to
limit information to Congress. The result was that CBO and
GAO convinced Congress to require all the original informa-
tion and add production rate and operational/suppport data
also. By asking for recommendations from all relevant
parties, Congress hoped to resolve the problems with the
SAR and UCR submissions.
The interviewee made some general comments that
coincided with previous recommendations made by PMs,
SECNAV, OSD, and the Congressional staffer. He recommended
automation lo streamline the administrative process of
submitting the SAR and UCR. It would reduce the frustration
level in updating such detailed accounting data and provide
a standard format for all Services to use. He recomrr.ended
deleting; unnecessary and repetitive data. As data become
irrelevant, it should be deleted.
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The CBO report to Congress contained several
recommendations which would improve the completeness,
usefulness, accuracy and timeliness of the SAR and UCR.
[Ref. il;p. 4]
The SARs have excluded certain costs which should be
considered part of the total system. For example, the
December 1984 SAR excluded costs for the MX Missile (to
develop flight test missiles, purchase all equipment for
flight testing and research of base missiles totalling $4.6
billion) and the M-1 Tank (research and development costs
for gun enhancement and armor-piercing cartridge development
totalling $1.8 billion). The amounts were found by compar-
ing the estimates in the SARs with footnotes in old SARs,
and the Congressional Data Sheets and RDT&E Descriptive
Summaries. Because such costs directly relate to the
weapon system and are normally included in the SAR estimate
for other weapons, the excluded costs should have been in
the SAR for the MX Missile and M-1 Tank. [Ref. 11: p. 5]
Currently the SARs reflect the Navy ship programs
only through the FYDP. They do not contain total system
cost through the expected life of the program, as required
by the SAR instructions. The Congressional Data Sheets for
the Trident II Submarine, SSN-21 Submarine, SSN-688 Subma-
rine and DDG-51 Destroyer contain $2.4 billion in advance
procurement funds for ships to be procured in fiscal years
beyond the FYDP, but the SAR coes not reflect that cost. To
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be consistent the SAR for ship programs should contain
total program costs. [Ref. ll:p. 5]
The estimates in the SARs do not represent the
current Administration budget. For example, on May 3,
1984, the Administration revised the budget submitted in
February for fiscal year 1985. The revisions were not
included in the SARs until a year later with the annual
report. These changes could have been provided in the SARs
to Congress on July 30, 1984 with a quarterly report.
Therefore, cost estimates should be updated to reflect
significant changes in estimates or policies relating to
the annual budget approval. [Ref. ll:p, J]
Unit cost threshold breaches of more than 15
percent above the baseline estimate of a given year were
established in 1981 when inflation was much higher than it
is now. The thresholds shoula be reconsidered, according
to CBO, to reflect the decline in inflation rates. If a
program estimate grew at a rate of 15 percent each year,
the estimate would double in five years, quadruple in 10
years, and never exceed the thresholds for reporting unit
costs. CBO recommended that the threshold be lowered to 10
percent or more, to reflect exception reporting for signifi-
car. I cost growth. [Ref. 11: p. 91
The December SARs are submitted to Congress in two
stages, an advance copy 30 days after submission of the
Presioent's budget and a final version within 30 days after
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the preliminary submission. The advance SARs are often
changed as a result of DoD and Service reviews of the data.
Therefore, any analysis of the advance SARs has to be
redone when the final versions are released. The inter-
viewee recommended that the preliminary report be deleted
and only a final copy be submitted 45 days after the
President's budget. [Ref. ll:p. 10]
The interviewee felt that the CBO would not become
involved with the Acquisition Strategy Report. Therefore,
he provided no comments on its use or potential change.
5 . General Accounting Office
The General Accounting Office (GAO) perceives the
SAR and UCR as largely historical documents based on the
official approved program. Thus, they do not reflect
anticipated, cost estimate changes or show quantity changes
under consideration.
The GAO uses the SAR and UCR in their auditing
function for Congress. In that role, they would like to
have more insight into the planning and aec ision-making
process of DoD. Accordingly, they promote prospective
information to includea in the SARs and UCRs.
In tneir report to Congress in response to the FY36
legislation, they recommended tnat DoD disclose tne total
nuraoer of units it is considering for a program by providin;
a footnote when that number is different from the approvea
program repcrtea in the SAR. UCRs should disclose any
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anticipated cost growth that has not been included in the
latest officially approved estimates. [Ref. 14:p. 2]
DoD maintains that such estimates are likely to change and
that several estimates related to the same anticipated
change may exist within DoD at the same time. GAO suggested
that DoD continue to report the approved program but
provide a narrative section which describes matters under
consideration which are likely to result in significant
cost, schedule, or quantity changes. This would provide
Congress with a better perspective on how firm the official
approved program estimates are. [Ref. 14:p. 2]
GAO made three recommendations which would clarify
the presentation of data. First, they suggested using
graphs to display SAR data elements, such as total program
costs, program unit cost, and total program quantity. These
graphs would surface trends, identify matters requiring
attention, and make the SAR easier to understand and use.
Second, GAO recommended using cost-quantity curves
to track unit cost changes for authorized and funded units
to measure current cost estimates against baseline esti-
mates
.
Third, GAO recommended developing program summaries
that would provide a program overview that is readily
understandable in revealing whether a project is on schedule
and witnin its baseline cost estimate. [Ref. 14:p. 2]
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All these recommendations are based on making the
analytical data easier to use and understand. GAO believes
that there is a need to undertake a long-term effort to
overhaul^ the Federal Government's financial management
systems to correct many problems that characterize not only
the SARs but other financial management systems within the
Government. [Ref. 14:p. 2]
GAO, like the CBO, will not become involved with
the Acquisition Strategy Report, Therefore, it will not be
addressed in this portion of the thesis.
B. SUMMARY
This chapter reviewed the various uses of the SAR, UCR
and Acquisition Strategy Report prepared by DoD. The PM
uses the SARs and UCRs as ready references and the acquisi-
tion plan as a statement of objectives and on agreement
with management. SECDEF also uses the SARs and UCRs as
ready references and SECNAV uses the acquisition plan as a
control document to ensure compliance with CICA. Congress
uses the SARS and UCRs as oversight documents after they
have been synthesized and generalized. Congress will also
use the Acquisition Strategy Report as a compliance documenL
for enhanced competition. The CBO and GAO, as the analyti-
cal non-management arrr.s of Congress, use the SARs and UCRs




Each user group had different problems and recommenda-
tions for improving the reports. However, there are some
common links between these problems and recommendations.
These commonalities as well as unique issues will be




This chapter will analyze the research data that have
been gathered from current literature, legislation and
personal interviews relative to the SAR, UCR, and Acquisi-
tion Strategy Report.
In reviewing the acquisition process, the researcher
found that the PM faces many choices and risks. For
example, the PM must decide whether to use concurrency with
technical and operational evaluation testing, whether to
use organic or inorganic maintenance philosophies, determine
whether cost and schedule estimates are valid, or whether
the contractor's performance capabilities are under or
overstated. All these choices can impact the program
relative to cost, schedule or performance.
Based on an analysis of the acquisition and budget
process, tne researcher found that there are certain
controls or management systems instituted within the
Federal Government whicn alert management to problems. The
acquisition process has milestone decisions; nowever, they
are infrequent considering tr.e 20 year average acquisition
cycle. The budget process uses annual funding approvals,
out the POM and FYDP do not provide a picture of total
program costs or an assessment of the program.
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The SAR provides management reporting from a baseline
and projects total program costs, but the report is consi-
dered by some users to be voluminous and too detailed. The
UCR provides cost growth on an exception basis, but the
threshold is thought by users to be either too high or too
low. The Acquisition Strategy Report is generally thought
of by users as a compliance report for enhanced competition
All of the reports listed above provide DoD management
and Congress with information on the progress of the weapon
system. The researcher observed that there are common and
unique problems associated with generating and using the
various reports submitted to Congress, These problems and
issues are presented and analyzed in the sections that
follow.
B. THE SAR AND UCR
1 . Diverse Interest s
The SARs are status reports from the Department of
Defense to the Congress on major acquisition programs. The
reports include each program manager's best estimate of key
cost, schedule and technical information from the program.
They provide a basis for comparing current estimates with
earlier planning, development, or production estimates.
Based on the researcher's review of the current
legislature, significant increases in budget authority anc
outlays for defense investment programs in the President'j
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Budgets have brought increasing Congressional concern about
cost overruns in the acquisition of weapon systems. One of
the more comprehensive sources of data on the costs of major
weapon systems is the SAR. The exception report, the
UCR, alerts Congress to a certain level of cost growth.
Reasons for the increases in cost include program stretch-
outs, quantity reductions, management problems, inefficient
production rates, and engineering changes.
The SARs are useful to the Congress only to the
extent that they contain information relevant to Congres-
sional interests. Specifically, the oversight committees
of the Congress have expressed interest in the cost growth
of major programs, adherence to acquisition schedules, and
technical performance. The researcher observed that
Congress uses the SAR and UCR information only after
significant synthesis by the CBO.
The SAR and UCR, therefore are provided to two
groups with different needs. The Congress uses the SAR and
UCR for oversignt purposes and as a political hammer during
tne budget process. The CBO uses the SAR and UCR as a
research tool to analyze alternatives relative to choices
between weapon systems.
There are other groups that use the SAR ana UCR
inforiTa t ion . It is wortnwhile to analyze tneir needs ana
probler.is associated v/ith generating the report inforiuat ion
.
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The PHs use the reports as a ready reference for
Congressional inquiries. They do not use it as a management
tool or a decision document. The PM spends much time
developing the acquisition strategy and preparing submis-
sions for the acquisition process and budget process.
He must attend hearings before Congress and defend his
program for each budget year.
As the program develops, contractors provide status
reports to the PM on technical progress, schedule, and
funds expenditure through design reviews, progress reports
and Cost/Schedule Control Systems reports.
The researcher observed that the PM generates
information contained in the SAR and UCR through existing
documents in the acquisition process, budget process and
contractor progress reports. Also, data are updated annually
as the program passes through acquisition milestones or
develops new funding estimates for the FYDP. The SAR fixes
a baseline when the program is designated as a major weapon
system, and that baseline can only be changed with approvals
as the system achieves acquisition milestones. Therefore,
the SAR contains data from an historical perspective and
from a future perspective.
SECNAV and SECDEF have authority to make decisions
during tne acquisition process and control funding through
the POM process. They require surnrr.ary data and an
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assessment of tne system to determine how well the system
is expected to satisfy its mission.
SECNAV and SECDEF are concerned with resource
allocation, especially in these times of a reduced defense
budget. The SAR and UCR are too detailed for SECNAV and
SECDEF to use in their decision process. However, they do
use the report to monitor program progress. The acquisition
milestone documents come infrequently (considering a 20
year average cycle) and the budget process only covers a
five year projection.
As stated above, Congress uses the SAR and UCR only
after it has been highly synthesized by someone else,
either the staffs or CBO. It provides too much detail for
a generalized review of the weapon system. Congress needs
data in order to prioritize budget decisions and to evaluate
how DoD is r.ianaging itself. V/ith the thrust for enhanced
competition. Congress also needs to assure compliance with
CICA.
The researcher observed that the CBO is the primary
user of the SAR and UCR. They use the cost data to answer
"what if" questions fror.: Congress and to recreate the FYDP,
since Congress does not receive the detailed support aata
fro.Ti DoD. However, the SAR can be inconsistent with trie
President's Buageu and Congressional Data Sheets. Because
there are conflicts, CBO cannot rely totally on the SAR and
must Qc further research in order to verify some of the co3t
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information. Their primary interest is cost data which is
available through support documentation in the budget,
existing program management documentation, and contractor
progress reports.
GAO is also interested in cost information in the
SAR; however they also want insight into the planning and
projections of DoD. They require quantitative information
and also overview or summary information in order to
perform their auditing role for Congress.. They prefer
pictorial presentations, such as graphs, cost-quantity
curves or summary sheets, in order to see trends in DoD
management of weapon systems. The researcher observed that
this summary concept would coincide with the Congressional
oversight role. However, GAO's demand for management and
internal decision documentation is contrary to the decentra-
lization concept within DoD.
In summary. Congress uses the reports only after
they have been highly synthesized. CBO uses the cost data
for very detailed analysis, but they find conflicts and
omissions and must verify data from other sources. GAO
prefers more insight into the decision process and trend
data through pictorial presentations. Based on tnese
differing interests, the researcher observed that it is
difficult for DoD management and Congress to deciae what
information snould oe included in the SAR and to what
detail. The SARs must be short enoup^h to be usable for
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people who have little time to review them and yet they
should present complete and accurate data which is not
misleading,
2 . _ Relevancy of the Data
The SAR and UCR contain very detailed data. The
researcher observed that most users felt it could be
streamlined or reduced to some degree.
Over the 19 years of its existence, the SAR has
become larger and more detailed. It has been "additive"
rather than changed, DoD originally designed the SAR to
report on the progress in meeting designated cost, schedule
and performance targets of a program, to focus management
attention primarily on changes to the plan, and to highlight
breaches of program thresholds. However, the SAR is now
used by several groups with different requirements. The
researcher found that users felt the SAR is very informa-
tive, but it is difficult to read and too complex. There is
always the argument regarding how much detail to disclose;
tnere is the problem of determining what the numbers snould
indicate .
There is a natural tendency for DoD and PMs to
"tighten up" when Congress asks questions about a program.
However, the researcner found tnat Congress appreciated
honesty, truthfulness and factual inforn.ation . The i;npres-
sion receivea from Congressional staffs was tne more
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Congress knows about a program, the more they will tend
to support the PM.
When OSD made their major reductions to the SAR
submiss-ipn in 1983f it was perceived as limiting informa-
tion to Congress. The reaction from Congress was to require
all of the original information, add further requirements,
and impose the requirements statutorily. Rather than review
the report, the SAR and UCR were legislated in total. The
incident in 1985 is another example of the additive nature
of Government reports, rather than an objective evaluation
of needs.
The researcher found after reviewing the SAR that
information in the SAR is repetitive. Data are not deleted
as a system progresses through the acquisition process. The
SAR must address the system from day of origin and "rehash"
that information with each report. Data can become irrele-
vant, such as early testing information when a program is
well into production.
Baselines are established with the initial SAR.
A baseline can only change as the system progresses into
another acquisition phase. Even then, updating the baseline
may be denied. The PM must extrapolate new cost, schedule
and performance data from old baselines, making his job that
mucn harder. As a result, current baselines may not be




Timing of the data is very relevant. The SAR is
required when a system is designated as a major weapon
system, which can occur at any point in the acquisition
process..^ Generally, the SAR is prepared at Milestone II
when production cost information is available. Inter-
viewees in OSD recommended that the SAR be provided no
earlier than Milestone II, since data are ill-defined and
subject to change. The Congressional staff member recom-
mended that the SAR be delayed until after Milestone for
similar reasons.
Another problem identified by interviewees from DoD
regarding SAR data is the fact that unit costs include
development as well as production costs. By dividing the
total program costs, including the research and non-recur-
ring costs, by the number of units, there is a distorted
view of the cost to produce each weapon system. The
researcher observed that DoD personnel felt that unit costs
should only consider production costs, since program
development costs can vary so much from system-to-system.
A final point concerning relevancy of data is tne
level of various thresholds. The Congressional staffer
suggested that Congress should view the SAR as an exception
report, required whenever there is a significant variance
from original estimates. Tnis coincides with the Paci<ara
Commission recommendation for oaselining. However, tne
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appropriate threshold would be difficult to define in terms
of significant.
The quarterly report threshold is five percent
change .in total program costs or a three-month change in any
schedule milestone. OSD recommended the thresholds be
changed to 10 percent and six months, respectively. These
thresholds would match DSARC thresholds where the DSARC
chair must be notified and a potential management review be
performed.
The UCR is required when there is a 15 percent
increase in unit costs on a major contract. However, this
percentage does not differentiate between cost growth due to
inflation, increased scope, or change orders within the
scope of the program. The CBO would like to see this
threshold lowered to ten percent, since it can be adjusted
annually, rather than over the life of the program.
Both the SAR quarterly reports and the UCR are
submitted in breach situations. The UCR is developed from
information contained in Section 12 of the SAR. The
researcher observed that the exception reports could be
combined, streamlining the administrative effort by the PM
and still provide Congress with notice of a breach.
3 . Accuracy
The researcher observed that there are problems
with interpreting cost variance categories, inconsistent
methoas in preparing the reports due to a lack of training,
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and a failure to update the SAR to coincide with the
approved budget.
The PMs have a difficult time categorizing changes
in prog.ram costs into the seven categories outlined in the
SAR. As a result, they may apply costs to an area that is
not appropriate. They also become creative accountants
trying to make the numbers fit.
The PMs pointed out that there is a tremendous
learning time required in order to prepare the SAR. Also,
over 100 program offices each prepare the SAR. OSD stated
that they spend time correcting tabular errors before the
SAR is submitted to Congress. The researcher observed that
there are many opportunities for mathematical and interpre-
tive errors to occur in the report with so many offices
preparing the report.
According to the CBO, the SAR can be inconsistent
with other cost reports, such as the Congressional Data
Sheets. The SAR omits relevant costs, like ttie examples
given for tne MX Missile and tne M-1 Tank. Because of
normal personnel turnover, the researcher found that the SAR
is prepared by people who may not be totally familiar with
its complexities.
According to OSD, the Services differ in their
training programs uo prepare PMs and their staffs to
properly develop the SAR. The Air Force has an extensive
zraiViir)^ program, incluaing a workshop that is given to each
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PM. Navy and Army personnel are trained on the job.
Because of this lack of central training, the SAR can
contain errors in mathematical computations and interpreta-
tions o.f^cost variance categories.
According to the CBO, the SARs are not consistent
with the approved budget. The SARs must match the Presi-
dent's budget when it is submitted in February, However,
the SAR is not updated to match the final budget until the
next annual SAR submission. Thus, agencies like the CBO
have conflicting data from DoD, This can create a percep-
tion of confusion and mismanagement by DoD,
4 . Automation
The reports demand accuracy and completeness, since
they are submitted to one of the highest levels within
Government. OSD, which administers the reports, is con-
cerned with ensuring that the reports are complete and
follow the prescribed format. That is difficult when so
many different people at different experience levels are
preparing the reports. The preliminary reports typically
contain errors in computations, which must be corrected
within a very short timeframe.
Currently, there is no uniform hardware or software
computer system that standardizes report processing.
The PMs addressed the advantage of automation in updatin5
cost information and preparing a consistent format; OSD
acknowledged automation would help in coordinating all the
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reports; CBO discussed the advantage of automation in
providing data which matches other cost data reports
provided by DoD. However, a system has not been instituted
which wjoyld automate the SAR and UCR for all services.
Funds have been offered by Congress to automate the
SAR. That offer was made to ease report generation. By
making the PM's job easier, Congress would get better data
and more acceptance of the reporting requirement.
5 . Time of Submission
The users had mixed comments about the required due
dates for the SAR and UCR. The PMs felt their time was
compressed because of the various management layers the SAR
and UCR must go through before reaching Congress. OSD has
a major coordination effort frorri over 100 different program
offices. They stated that they do meet the SAR deadline.
However, they felt if graphs were required they would not
be able to have each PM correct graphs in time to meet the
due date. They did request that the UCR scnedule be
redefined as seven working days rather than seven calendar
days
.
The CBO recommended tnat tne preliminary SAR be
deletea since it is usually changed and replaced within 30
days by the final report. They also recomrr.ended the final
report ce submitted 15 days earlier.
The researcner observed triat tae PMs and OSD are
under extrer.iely tight deadlines, considering tne numoer of
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different program offices involved, the lack of automation
and the sheer size and complexity of the SAR and UCR.
6 . Pictorial and Summary Data
. Jhe researcher found the SAR and UCR to be a report
of primarily numbers. Currently, the SAR and UCR contain
no graphics or charts. GAO has maintained for many years
that the SAR should provide graphs and summary data to make
the information easier to use and understand,
OSD has rejected the idea of graphics. Since the
SAR is prepared by approximately 100 different program
offices rather than a central function, ensuring uniformity
and accuracy would be nearly impossible. Errors in graphics
would require correction by the originating office, and
this could not be done within the present timeframes.
The researcher has found that the analytical arms
of Congress, CBO and GAO are accustomed to preparing
summary level charting, where PMs and DoD normally provide
detailed numerical data. Therefore, the PMs would be
submitting data in a format unfamiliar to them, adding to
the learning process at the program office level. Also,
summary data can tend to be conclus ionary in nature. The
PMs, if providing summary status of their programs would
tend to report in a complimentary light, which may not
n.atcn observations by the analytical groups within Congress.
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7 . Reporting Potential Program Change s
GAO has recommended that the SAR reflect antici-
pated, but not yet officially approved cost estimate changes
or changes in quantities under consideration. DoD continues
to disagree with any requirement to disclose options being
considered during internal decision-making processes such
as the PPBS or DSARC, Such items are reported when final
decisions are made* Such items are likely to change,
according to DoD, and there may be several estimates for
the same change, GAO suggested providing the information
with a footnote and updating with each submission.
The researcher observed that the SAR and UCR
contain many explanatory notes already and data in the SAR
is subject to several budgetary and milestone updates with
eacn submission.
C. THE ACQUISITION STRATEGY REPORT
Tne acquisition strategy considers the weapon system in
the acquisition process from cradle to grave. The acquisi-
tion plan provides objectives and a method of action for a
tot.al system or a specific segment of that system. The
acquisition plan is internal tc DoD and is updated as tne
systeni progresses through the acquisition milestones.
The acquisition plan is a control docut.ient for the PM.
It sets a oaseline for tne system and can be consiaered a
contract: cetween the PH and [7ianat;ienient to develop and
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produce a weapon system. If used properly, it can provide
program stability for cost, schedule and performance
parameters
.
SEC.N^V and SECDEF are using the acquisition plan as a
compliance document, to ensure that enhanced competition
provides reduced costs. Because of Congressional concern
over program cost growth and emphasis on competition, a
report is now required from the SECDEF to Congress relative
to using multiple sources in FSED and Production and
Deployment
As shown above, the acquisition plan is used as a
control document and a compliance document. The researcher
observed that the acquisition plan has the potential of
other uses within the acquisition process.
SECNAV is compiling information relative to acquisition
plan submission and compliance with CICA. The acquisition
plan could becor.;e a data base for statistical major weapon
system acquisition information. As advocates discover
SECNAV's data base, they may request that information be
compiled for their functional area.
The acquisition plan has become additive since its
inception. The FAR added to the content, and the Services
have expanded coverage and lowered thresholds. As a
result, the plan is longer and is required more often. The
plan covers ousiness as well as teciinical decisions.
However, SECKAV is placing niore empnasis on the business
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decisions, since technical decisions, such as testing, are
covered in greater detail in other docurr.ents, e.g., the Test
and Evaluation Master Plan. However, the plan currently
requires, a complete discussion of all technical and business
aspects of the system. SECNAV may have a difficult time
convincing the technical advocates to reduce or delete
coverage in their functional area.
Congress does not receive a copy of the acquisition
plan. With the new legislation, they will receive a report
from SECDEF relative to competition in FSED and Production.
That report will most likely be extracted from the acquisi-
tion plan. Most people interviewed felt that the intent of
Congress was not to receive the plan, but to receive
assurance tnat DoD is complying with CICA. Therefore, they
saw no potential that the plan would become legislated.
However, if this should happen, the plan would probably
become vague and contain conditions and caveats.
The staffs felt tnat the plan was too detailed and
sophisticated (e.g., acquisition language) for use by
Congress. Congress needs synthesized data for its oversignt
role. The Acquisition Strategy Report will provide sun.mary
data Lo ensure enhanced competition will reduce program
costs
.
Tr.e researcher observea that DoD does not always provide
relevant ana cor:iplete information to Congress. As a result,
Congress legislates data requirements ana requires tneir
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non-management agencies, CBO or GAO, to synthesize the data
for them. DoD will have to avoid the tendency to be vague
with Congress when submitting the Acquisition Strategy
Report,.
C. SAR/ACQUISITION STRATEGY REPORT SIMILARITIES
There are several similarities in the evolution,
generation and use. of the SAR and acquisition strategy.
Both reports were originally developed for internal DoD
management control purposes. The SAR is now required by law
and has been an item of conflict for several years.
The acquisition plan has remained internal to DoD until the
FY86 Authorization Act, which requires a compliance report
extracted from the plan.
Both the SAR and the acquisition plan have become
additive since inception, through regulation or legislation.
Information is required for advocates of functional areas,
analysts for quantitative reviews, and auditors for projec-
tions. Neither report has been reviewed for streamlining
or consolidation.
The SAR is an historical aocument, with minimal assess-
ment data. The acquisition plan is a prospective document.
However, both documents contain data that appear to become
unnecessary as the system evolves.
Con^iress is interested in how well DoD manages its
total resources. The SAR provides total program cost,
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schedule and performance information. Tine acquisition plan
provides total program planning from cradle to grave. Uith
these two documents, Congress can gain insight into DoD
program, management. However, based on interviews, both
reports are too complex for Congress to use as submitted.
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed issues and problems associated
with generating and using the SAR, UCR and Acquisition
Strategy Report. General observations have been made
relative to the diverse interests, relevance and accuracy of
data, and automation of the SAR and UCR. The acquisition
plan has been evaluated as far as its current use as a
control document and potential use as a data base and
legislative report. Similarities between the SAR and
acquisition plan were addressed. Chapter V will provide
conclusions and recommendations based on the analysis in
this chapter.
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V . CONCLUSI ON S AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCI^USIONS
The following conclusions were developed as a result of
the research effort.
There is no other documentation that provides management
information to the level of detail or in the form as the SAR
and UCK
.
The SAR provides historical data an prospective data
for the total program. Cost, schedule and performance
goals are defined and monitored. Management is made aware
of cost growth, schedule slippage and poor performance
through routine and exception reporting. Without the
reporting systems Congress would not be able to judge DoD's
management system. Also, there would be little incentive
for the PM to report negative results or interservice
rivalry .
Congressmen and their s taf fs do not use the data from
the SAR and UC R as it is submitted .
Congress needs highly synthesized data in an aggregate
state in order to perform their oversight role. Tne CBO
and GAO, the non-management arms of Congress, perform
analysis and generalizations of tne data in recommending
alternatives for budget prioritization.
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Data contained in th e SAR and UCR can be irr ele vant,
inconsistent or inaccu rate .
The SAR has become aaditive and also requires "rehash-
ing" information from the initialization of the program.
Baselines are not current with other documents in the
acquisition or budget process. Costs do not match with
other reports from DoD, such as the Congressional Data
Sneets. Cost variances are difficult to categorize and
encourage creative accounting.
The SAR and UCR are not automated under one standardized
computer package .
The PMs prepare the SAR or UCR using their own programs
or using no automation at all. This adds time and confu-
sions when over 100 program managers are submitting the
reports to OSD.
The SAR and UCR zry to satisfy too many users wi tn
dif feren u interests .
Congress needs synthesized data in order to perform
their oversight role to ensure tnat puDlic funds are spent
properly and efficiently. SECNAV and SECDEF, as the
aecision iTiaKers for a weapon system in the acquisition
process and PPES, require assess rrient aata to prioritize
resources. C30 ana GAO require aetailed cost information
m order to provide analytical support to Congress.
Desi^niri,^ one output to meet the needs of several users
',;ith diverse needs is not practical.
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Data in the SAR and UCR, if submitted prior to Milestone
II are too ill-defined a nd are too frequently revised to be
a ppl i cal? lY U§^d.
The SAR must be submitted for a system whenever it is
designated as a major weapon system. This can occur at any
time during the acquisition process. Weapon system documen-
tation prior to Milestone II does not contain production
cost estimates or well-defined program data.
It is not necessary to have two separate exception
reports fqr breach of t^hre$hQld? .
The UCR and SAR Quarterly Exception Reports are both
submitted when there has been a breach of cost growth.
Both reports are provided to the same users.
The Acquisition Strategy Report is provided for compli-
ance with existing competition legislation and will probably
not be expanded .
The Acquisition Strategy Report will provide an assur-
ance to Congress that DoD is pursuing competitive practices
whenever practicable. The philosophy is that enhanced
competition will reduce weapon system costs. The Report,
which is extracted from the acquisition plan, will address
the intent of DoD to apply the philosophy to weapon systems
acquisition. The acquisition plan is a document that is
acquisition-specific and beyond Congressional needs.
Breach t hresholds should be evaluated for a mor e
appropriate level. This would include th e cost and schedu ic
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threshold for the total program cost within the SAR and th e
weapon system yinit cost within the UCR .
The five percent threshold for breach of total program
costs (requiring a quarterly SAR report) should be raised
to ten percent to match DSARC thresholds for program
review. The 15 percent annual change in unit cost (requir-
ing a UCR) should be adjusted to reflect constant dollar
thresholds. Annual adjustment to thresholds based on
projected inflation rates is unnecessarily complex.
Graphics and summary data should be performed bv CBO
and GAP and not be made a part of the SAR or UCR .
The CBO and GAG, as analytical groups, are highly
trained analysts who are familiar with graphics and chart-
ing. They are also required by Congress to synthesize data
and provide alternatives and recommendations. They would
oe better able to analyze and summarize data without the
prejudicial viewpoint of the P.M.
DoD is currently not equipped or trained to provide
graphic displays, especially given the short timeframe for
submission of the reports.
Prospective program data shou ld not be inc luded in the
SAR or UCR.
If DoD provided prospective data relative to estiniated
cost cnanges or quantity caauges, it would require more
explanations and more upaates for a report t^nat is already
overloaded witn explanations. The report as it is preparea
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today already is not updated often enough to suit CBO or
GAO. The program office would not be able to accommodate
the changes in the program that are initiated but never
approved, Prospective data would only add to the confusion
of too many numbers already.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are relevant for this
research effort.
The SAR should be retained as a management report^ but
it should be streamlined, cleared of inconsistencies, and
automated .
The SAR provides a more timely update for program
status than the acquisition milestone documentation and
projects costs for the total program through production and
deployment.
The SAR and UCR should be reviewed for irrelevant,
inconsistent or inaccurate data .
The SAR and UCR should be reviewed to simplify and
streamline the data, and avoid additive data. Irrelevant
information should be deleted as the system progresses
through the acquisition process. Extensive training
programs should be instituted at the OSD level for all
Services in order to assure consistency in preparing the
reports. There should be a concurrence on application of
the cost variance categories during the training program.
9it
The SAR and UCR shou ld be a u tomated to provide a
central hardware and software p ackage for all PMs to use .
Automating the SAR and UCR would reduce administrative
efforts, and provide consistency in report submission.
Also, a graphics package could be procured, with concurrence
from CBO and GAO, that would satisfy their summary data
requirements
.
The SAR should. not be required until after Milestone II .
Even though the legislation requires a SAR submission
when a system has been designated as a major weapon system,
the relevant and stable program data does not occur until
after Milestone II. Therefore, submitting any data earlier
will only serve to have Congress involved prematurely.
The UCR could be combine d with the SAR Quarterly
Reports for submission to Congress .
The SAR Quarterly report, required for a five percent
breacn in total program costs, and the UCR, required for a
15 percent breach in unit costs could be combined under one
exception report suomission by the PM. This consolidation
would reduce administrative efforts and still provide the
exception notification to Congress.
The Acquisition St rate g y Re port should remain as
written with no expa ns ion of report data .
The Report meets the requirement of compliance certifi-
cation by DoD. Any additional inforn.ation would go beyond
the scooe of CICA
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C. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was: How are major
weapon sj^stems acquisition reports utilized by Congress,
and how might these reporting requirements be accomplished
more efficiently and effectively?
Congress utilizes the SAR in a highly synthesized,
aggregated format in order to make budget decisions and
evaluate DoD management. Congress uses the UCR as an
exception report when costs of a program grow beyond an
acceptable threshold. Congress uses the Acquisition
Strategy Report to ensure compliance with competition
initiatives .
The reporting requirements can be streamlined to reduce
repetitive, additive data. The reports could be combined
(e.g., the UCR ana quarterly reports) to reduce administra-
tive effort. The reports could be automated to be more
efficient and consistent.
The subsidiary questions were:
1. V/hat is the effect on the development, execution
and change of major weapon systems acquisition
because of the reporting requirements to Congress?
The development, execution and change of major weapon
systems acquisition is impacted by tne reporting require-
ments to Congress. With total program costs available to
tnem, Con^^ress can gain insight into DoD management of
resources. Congress can ask their analytical groups to
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program stability, new starts and baselining
are all current issues which are evaluated through reports
submitted to Congress.
The Acquisition Strategy Report is a compliance report
and merely reinforces what is already being advocated
within DoD and the Military Services. Both SECNAV and
SECDEF have initiated increased emphasis on competition in
the early stages of the acquisition process. The Acquisi-
tion Strategy Report confirms those initiatives to Congress.
2, What are the major issues and policy decisions
surrounding the reporting requirements?
The SAR was originally developed by DoD as an internal
control document. In 1967, Congress legislated the report
as part of their oversight role. Because it was perceived
tnat DoD was trying to limit information to Congress with
tneir major reductions in the 1983 SAR, Congress legislated
the format of tne SAR and UCR and requested recommendations
from all relevant parties to r.iake the SAR and UCR more
effective .
Tne UCR was created because Congress felt that the SAR
was too voluminous to recognize when a program was experi-
encing significant cost growtn. In 1982 the I.'unn-I-'.cCurdy
Araendmen t required tne UCR as an exception report for
certain oreacn situations.
Congress wants assurance zaat ennancea competition is
reducing program costs, w'itn ttie FY86 Authorization Act,
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Congress required the Acquisition Strategy Report, to
assure compliance by DoD with competition initiatives,
3. Are the reports in fact submitted, and are they
timely and accurate?
The reports, because they are legislated are submitted
to Congress on time. However, they are not always accurate.
Major programs have omissions in total costs; the reports
are not consistent with the President's budget; and cost
variance categories are misinterpret.
4. Should the reports be enhanced or eliminated?
Given the absence of the reports, there would be no
measure of whether cost, schedule and performance parameters
were correctly defined, or that overruns, slippage or poor
performance were brought to higher management for correc-
tion. Therefore, the reports should not be eliminated,
since there are no other systems that would perform the
management reporting function. They could be enhanced by
automation, summary data and graphical displays.
The Acquisition Strategy Report need not be enhanced
since it is serving the purpose of compliance with competi-
tion initiatives. It could be eliminated as competition in
the FSED phase of the acquisition becomes standard business
practice
.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Several items could warrant furtner research. They
involve aata computation, data presentation and thresnolds.
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The cost variance categories seem to be the most
controversial item in the SAR. A separate study could be
performed to align the categories with programmatic problems
in cost, growth.
GAO has recommended several times that the SAR contain
graphical presentations and cost-quantity curves. A
graphics package could be developed for PMs and OSD to
utilize for preparing the SAR.
The Acquisition Strategy Report involves a very small
portion of the acquisition plan. However, the plan has
become additive, just like the SAR. A separate study could
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